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ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT IN REPLY TO APPELLEE'S BRIEF
I
PAJ'S DUTY TO MARSHAL ON QUESTIONS OF FACT NOT RIPE
BECAUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S INSUFFICIENT FINDINGS
OF FACT,
As asserted in PAJ's original brief, the Trial Court failed to make sufficient
findings that are sufficiently detailed to show that the "court's judgment or decree
follows logically from, and is supported by the evidence. Thefindingsshould be
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." See Rasband v. Rasband,
752 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 131 P.2d 996, 999
(Utah 1987) (internal quotations and citation omitted). In the absence of sufficient
findings, it is impossible for PAJ to marshal the evidence, especially where the Trial
Court left it unclear as to what specific evidence it relied upon and failed to disclose the
steps it took in reaching its ultimate conclusion as to the value of PAJ shares. In short,
there are no specific findings for which PAJ can marshal evidence. Or asfiirtherstated in
Acton v. Deliran, "The absence offindingsof fact is a fundamental defect that makes it
impossible to review the issues that were briefed without invading the trial court's fact
finding domain." Id.
One must marshal the evidence to successfully "challenge the correctness of a trial
court's finding of fact." See Alta Industries LDTv. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993).

1

Thus, the existence of sufficient trial court findings is a pre-requisite to the obligation to
marshal. The marshalling requirements do not circumvent the Trial Court's obligation to
make sufficient findings.
PAJ fully intends to meet its duty to marshal the evidence as necessary once the
Trial Court clarifies its ruling by making sufficient findings of fact that can be logically
followed and clearly indicate the steps by which the Trial Court reached its conclusions.
No need to Marshal on Questions of Law
As it relates to the choice of valuation methods, the Utah Supreme Court has held
that such choice is a question of law and therefore does not require marshalling, of
evidence. See Hogle v. Zinetics Medical Inc., 63 P.3d 80, 86 (Utah 2002). The Utah
Supreme Court further indicated that: "We note that the selection of guideline companies
was part of the determination of market value, which is one of the three primary valuation
models." Id. at 87. "[W]hile the ultimate determination of fair value is a question of fact,
the determination of whether a given fact or circumstance is relevant to fair value under
[state law] is a question of law we review de novo." Id. at 84 (internal citations omitted).
II
PAJ PRESERVED THE ISSUE OF INSUFFICIENCY OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDINGS FOR APPEAL
The idea of Peterson arguing PAJ failed to preserve the issue of insufficient
findings is ironic. PAJ brought the Rule 52(b) Motion1 before the Trial Court. In reality

1

Together with its Motions under Rules 59(a), 60(a), 60(b)(1) 60(b)(6) and 62(b) Ut. R.
Civ. Proc.
2

it was Peterson who failed to preserve the issues he has now appealed. Peterson did not
file a cross Rule 52(b) Motion.
Peterson contends PAJ only asked the Trial Court to address incomplete or
erroneous findings rather than insufficient findings. Contrary to Peterson's assertions, a
plain reading of PAJ's initial and reply Memorandums in Support of Motions for
Amendment of Judgment, Relief from Judgment and Amendment of Findings clearly
demonstrate otherwise. PAJ's Reply Memorandum stated:
"PAJ further seeks 7 additional findings under Rule 52(b) URCP. Absent these
findings, PAJ submits the Decision is not "sufficiently detailed [to] include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual
issue was reached." See Andrus v. Andrus, 196 P.3d 754 (Ut. Ct. App. 2009) at 759; See
Exhibit F, Brief ofAppellants."
PAJ also notes its Motion for Amendment of Findings under rule 52(b) was filed
together with a motion to correct erroneous findings under Rule 60(a)(b(l) and b(6) and a
Motion to for Relief of Judgment under Rule 59(b) URCP. While PAJ did ask the Trial
Court to correct mathematical errors, such was only one aspect of the post-judgment
relief it sought. As summarized in PAJ's Reply Memorandum, PAJ gave the Trial Court
the opportunity to correct its findings on all issues currently on appeal.
PAJ reiterates three of the questions left unanswered by the Trial Court:
Additional Finding Requested #1 - The Court failed to address the issue of whether, as a
matter of law, an adjustment to fair value should be made when taking into account
enterprise versus personal goodwill. This issue was well briefed beginning on Page 17 of
the Bowles Report, and the court heard significant testimony on this issue at trial.

3

Additional Finding Requested #2 - Once the legal conclusion regarding goodwill is
resolved, the Court then must make a finding as to the proper adjustment to fair value.
Additional Finding Requested #4 - The Court failed to make any findings justifying the
applicability of Townsend's market analysis, including a finding as to whether
Townsend's market data is comparable to PAJ given the vast discrepancy between
Townsend's market and income approaches.
The Trial Court went so far as to issue a new Memorandum Decision dated July
20,2009 2 . Nevertheless, on the key issues stated in PAJ's appeal, the Trial Court's
findings are not sufficient to "disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached." See Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) (citing
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P2d 1336, 1388 (Utah 1979).
PAJ cited facts and case law in support of its several requests for the Trial Court
to make its findings more specific and sufficient to satisfy the requirements articulated in
438 Main Street. See 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 99 P.3d 801 (Utah 2004).
As far back as 1928, the Utah Supreme Court held in Prows v. Hawley, 271 P. 31
(Utah 1928), that "it is the undoubted rule, that until the court has found on all material
issues raised by the pleadings, the findings are insufficient to support a judgment; and
that findings should be sufficiently distinct and certain as not to require an investigation
or review to determine what issues are decided. Id at 33. The "additional" findings
sought by PAJ in its Motion were "necessary" findings and required as a result of the
pleadings it filed and arguments it made at trial together with the necessity for the Trial
Court to make sufficient findings not to require an investigation on the part of PAJ or
guess as to how the Trial Court reached its conclusions.
2

The Trial Court's Initial Memorandum Decision was dated April 17, 2009.
4

Ill
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW
Peterson asserts that the mere statement by the Trial Court that the fair value of
PAJ's shares is $459,000 is a sufficient finding when combined with its statement that it
found the Townsend Report to be more credible. Peterson further contends that all other
findings are "additional"findingsbolstering the Trial Court's opinion and are not
"necessary"findings.PAJ submits this are incorrect statements. While the Trial Court is
clearly authorized to exercise its broad discretion in weighing the evidence presented to
it, mere reliance upon an expert's opinion without providing any instructive guidance on
the steps the Trial Court took in reaching its own conclusions is problematic because it
requires "invading the trail courts fact-finding domain." See Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d
996, 999 (Utah 1987).
Under this rationale, a Trial Court's decision regarding fair value only has to
include a dollarfigurecoupled with a statement that expert one is right and expert two is
wrong. This approach provides no guidance and certainly is inconsistent with the rule of
law stated above that thefindingsmust be "sufficiently detailed to and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual
issue was reached." See Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (internal quotations and
citation omitted). A Trial Court still must articulate the basis upon which it reached its
conclusions and confirm the analysis of the expert witness relied upon in reaching its own

5

conclusions. The opinion of the expert witness does not replace the required analysis of
the Trial Court in making sufficient findings of fact.
For the reasons stated herein and as outlined in PAJ's opening Brief, the Trial
Court failed as a matter of law to make sufficient findings in reaching its conclusion as to
the value of the PAJ shares and otherwise justifying its reliance upon the Townsend
Report, the application of Townsend's market approach, its misguided understanding of
.92, etc.
IV
WHETHER THE NON-SOLICITATION AGREEMENT CONVERTED
PERSONAL GOODWILL TO ENTERPRISE GOODWILL IS A
QUESTION OF LAW AND IS A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION
The term "fair value" is used in at least three areas of Utah law: namely divorce,
dissenter rights and judicial dissolution. See Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476
(Utah 2008) (Divorce); UCA §16-10a-1301 (Dissenter's Rights); UCA §16-10a-1434(4)
(Judicial Dissolution).
It would appear in each instance the same definition applies. For example, Hogle
was a Dissenter's Rights case, which has been relied on by both parties in this Judicial
Dissolution case.
In helping trial courts determine fair value, the Appellate Courts have provided
some guidance. For example, Hogle also made it clear that "fair value" does not allow
for minority interest or lack of marketability discounts. See Hogle v. Zinetics Medical
Inc., 63 P.3d 80,90 (Utah 2002). Hogle also noted that fair value is not "liquidation
value" but "going concern value" in a Dissenter's Rights action. Id. at 86.
6

As outlined in PAJ's opening Brief, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the fair
value of a business in a divorce case "...should be determined independent of any
goodwill component. There can be no goodwill in a business that is dependent for its
existence upon the individual who conducts the enterprise and would vanish were the
individual to die, retire or quit work." See Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476,
490 (Utah 2008).
The question before this Court is whether goodwill should also be excluded when
determining fair value in a judicial dissolution action.3 A related question before the
Court is whether the undisputed "non-solicitation"4 provision in the shareholders'
employment agreements converts shareholder personal goodwill to enterprise goodwill?
The effect of a non-solicitation provision on personal goodwill is of great
importance to any shareholder asked to sign a "standard" non-solicitation or noncompetition agreement. If such an agreement destroys the value of a shareholder's
personal goodwill, the use of such "standard" agreements would be greatly affected. As
already articulated in PAJ's opening Brief, it would seem impossible for a nonsolicitation agreement to have any effect on personal goodwill, since the non-solicitation
agreement cannot transfer that person's qualifications, experiences, degrees, knowledge,
etc.
The question of how Utah Trial Courts should deal with goodwill in fair value
cases needs Appellate Court guidance—similar to how the courts have addressed
3
4

And likely a dissenters rights action as well.
As apposed to a non-competition agreement.

7

minority interest and lack of marketability discounts as well as "going concern value"
versus "liquidation value." PAJ respectfully requests that this Court provide instructions
that when determining fair value in a judicial dissolution action that the shareholders9
personal goodwill not be included in determining the fair value of the business.
V
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT RELIED UPON
AN INCORRECT CALCULATION OF THE 2001 BUY IN
As outlined in PAJ's opening Brief, the Trial Court indicated in its original
Memorandum Decision that it relied upon Jackson's 2001 buy-in as a "guidepost in its
decision." As part of PAJ's Motion for Relief of Judgment under Rule 60(a)(6) and
60(b)(1) and (6), PAJ directed the Trial Court to undisputed evidence introduced at trial
establishing that Jackson's 2001 buy-in was not a cash sale but rather financed by noninterest bearing Promissory Notes and asked the Trial Court to apply a present value
analysis to its calculations. See Motion to Amend Findings, Addendum F, pg. 5-7; TR at
688 and 875.
Rather than acknowledging and correcting its error, the trial courtflip-floppedby
then stating it did not rely on the same information it previously called a "guidepost."
This flip illustrates an apparent abuse of discretion in the Trial Court for failure to
acknowledge the consequences of its reliance on an inaccurate formula.

8

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, PAJ respectfully requests that this Court remand this case with
guidance to the Trial Court that will aid it in making sufficient findings regarding the fair
value of PAJ shares with detailed instructions as follows:
1)

That the Trial Court specifically address the comparability of the sample

companies used in Townsend's market approach to PAJ by making findings of fact
addressing the comparability in terms of company size, geographic location, revenues,
cash flow, etc.;
2)

That the Trial Court specifically address the issue of personal goodwill

with a holding by this Court that a fair value determination in dissolution cases does not
include personal goodwill of the shareholders;
3)

That this Court holds as a matter of law that the non-solicitation clause of

the employment agreement does not convert shareholder personal goodwill to enterprise
goodwill;
4)

That the Trial Court re-determine the fair value of PAJ exclusive of the

shareholders9 personal goodwill;
5)

That the Trial Court correct the mathematical error regarding the Jackson

2001 buy-in correct the consequence from any reliance thereon; and,
6)

That the Trial Court conduct an evidentiary hearing or new trial as may be

necessary to enable the Trial Court to make sufficient findings regarding these matters.

9

ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S CROSS-APPEAL BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
PAJ incorporates only Statements of Fact 2 and 3 proffered by Peterson.
Peterson's remaining "Statements of Facts" are better described as "allegations."
In regards to Statement four (4), Townsend valued Peterson's 36.37% interest as
of December 31,2006 as $459,000, and concluded further that Peterson should be
entitled to $46,625 of the undistributed cash as of December 31,2006. The allegation
that Peterson's interest was valued at $505,625 is incorrect. This issue is more
particularly argued in Argument Section I below herein.
Statements six (6) and seven (7) pertain to the interest rate awarded by the Trial
Court. PAJ notes that this matter was not brought as a breach of contract case but rather
judicial dissolution under Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1430. PAJ has more fully addressed
the issues regarding the interest rate in Argument Section II below herein.
Statements five (5), eight (8), nine (9), ten (10), eleven (11), twelve (12), thirteen
(13), fourteen (14), and fifteen (15), pertain to Peterson's allegations of oppressive
conduct, which are more particularly addressed in Argument Section III below herein.
I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS
DETERMINATION THAT PETERSON WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A
DISTRIBUTION OF CLAIMED EXCESS CASH
Peterson asserts that he was entitled to a distribution of additional cash on hand as
of December 31,2006. This Court should uphold the Trial Court's decision not to award
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Peterson any portion of the cash on hand held as of December 31, 2006, for the following
reasons:
Incorrect Standard of Review
Peterson contends the standard of review on this issue is de novo. This standard is
incorrect. A trial court's findings of fact will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.
See Lefavi v. Bertoch, 994 P.2d 817 (Utah Ct. App. 2000).
The Amount of Excess Cash is a Question of Fact
The real issue is whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in finding that none
of the $128,196 cash on hand on December 31,2006 was excess cash.
PAJ contended all of the cash on hand was necessary to run the business as a
going concern, Peterson contended that only $10,000 of the cash on hand was necessary
to run the business.
Failure to Marshal Evidence
While Peterson advances several positions he raised at trial, he fails to marshal the
evidence presented by PAJ as to why all of the cash on hand should remain with PAJ as a
going concern. In order to properly marshal evidence, Peterson must:
"Moreover, 'to mount a successful challenge to the correctness of a trial court's
findings of fact, [the]appellant must first marshal all the evidence supporting the
finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
findings even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below.' Alta
Indus. Ltd VHurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1993) (quoting Reid v Mut. Of
Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989))."
Peterson simply cites to evidence challenging the Trial Court's finding rather than
the evidence supporting the finding. The following references to the trial record

11

demonstrate that Peterson failed to marshal evidence thereby precluding the overturning
of the Trial Court's decision on this issue.
Evidence on which the Trial Court relied in determining PAJ had no excess cash:
Historical Cash Flow Problems Due to Lack of Sufficient Capital Reserves
Jackson described the change of management in 2004 when daily responsibility
was shifted from Peterson to Allred. See, Trial Transcript, Vol. II at Page 238, lines 5-8.
Jackson recalled how PAJ quite often existed " hand-to-mouth and the stress of meeting
the monthly payroll and the bills really created some anxiety for Alan and so we felt that
it would be necessary, prudent, and wise for us to start to work towards gaining cash as
we could," see, Trial Transcript, Vol. II at Page 238, lines 11-15. Jackson further
described how, as PAJ expenses continued to grow, so has their need for a greater cash
reserve on hand.
Jackson also described historically that there were many times that PAJ "had to
hold rent checks... had to delay payment of bills." See, Trial Transcript, Vol. II at Page
235, lines 2-3. Jackson continued on to state that PAJ "got to a point in 2006, we started
to be able to accumulate more cash flow." See, Trial Transcript, Vol. II at Page 235, lines
10-12.
Company January 2007 Obligations
Jackson also testified that his "feeling on the cash at the end of 2006 was that we
have obligations to pay. Jack wants to make a big deal that we kept that cash in the
intentional of squeezing him out, of not paying him the money. The reality is is that we
had a business to operate. We have $115,000 of expenses. We have been for some time
12

trying to have plenty of reserve..." See, Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill at Page 416, lines 1218. PAJ wanted to avoid the circumstances where "if we have a bad month, we're done."
See, Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill at Page 416, lines 18-19. PAJ wanted to further avoid
having to "ask our employees to not to take a payroll... .To ask vendors to accept
payments." See, Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill at Page 416, lines 20-23.
Dr. Tyler Bowles, PAJ's expert witness, testified that,".. .we have a CPA firm
here with approximately $1.4 million in expenses every year. This firm had a payroll
coming due of approximately $65,000 in five days after 12-31-06, plus employment taxes
related to that payroll of another $10,000, plus rent of about $10,000, plus there are other
ongoing expenses. It is not unusual; in fact, it's good management practice to have some
cash on hand at 12-31-06 to meet expenses that are going to be due very, very quickly.
Otherwise you're illiquid." See, Trial Transcript, Vol. II at Page 168, lines 15-23.
Bowles also described the change in management structure, ""management
structure of the firm changed and they deemed it a particularly poor management practice
to bleed the company dry at the end of every month, that holding cash, having some cash
to meet payroll five days later was a reasonable idea." See, Trial Transcript, Vol. II at
Page 225, lines 5-10. Bowles further noted that after his review, the books demonstrated
PAJ did "have trouble making payroll and rent and other things in previous years..." See,
Trial Transcript, Vol. II at Page 225, lines 16-17.
Mr. R. Brad Townsend, Peterson's expert witness, acknowledged in cross
examination if PAJ had a payroll obligation thefirstpart of January it could affect his
determination of cash on hand. See, Trial Transcript, Vol. I at Page 118, lines 4-5.
13

Townsend also all but acknowledged that it made sense to have enough cash to cover
$60,000 of payroll and $10,000 in rent coming due shortly. See, Trial Transcript, Vol. I
at Page 118, lines 18-25.
While Townsend stated, during cross examination, that he believed he was told
that PAJ had only $6,500 in year-end liabilities, this statement illustrates the shallowness
of Townsend's research. Even if Townsend believed he was told PAJ had only $6,500 in
expenses, Townsend had a duty to correlate that assumption with Townsend's own
conclusion that PAJ had over $1,362,498 in projected operating expenses for 2007,
including projected salaries and wages of $669,287 and rents of $119,220. See, Schedule
B, Trial Exhibit 90 (Townsend's Expert Report). The Trial Court recognized this
inconsistency when it failed to award Peterson any portion of the cash on hand.
One particular exchange between Townsend and PAJ's counsel, Mr. Hancey,
during cross examination illustrates the need for a capital reserve. "Q As a practical
matter, you're talking about an ongoing concern (inaudible), is it wise for a business to
hold in their cash reserves sufficient to cover maybe a month or so of expenses? A
Ummm, sure." See, Trial Transcript, Vol. I at Page 120, lines 6-10.
PAJ's Cash Reserves were in Line with Risk Management Associates (RMA)
Numbers
Bowles also described that PAJ's cash on hand was "right in line with the
Research [sic] Management Associates reporting of firms of this size, CPA firms of this
size had $185,000 cash on hand at the end of the year. So $185,000 in cash is not
unreasonable given all the liabilities and ongoing expenses they have." See, Trial

14

Transcript at 169, lines 1-5. The RMA report was submitted as Trial Exhibit 94.
Townsend also acknowledged that he relies upon RMA reports. See, Trial Transcript,
Vol. I at Page 120, lines 14-18. Upon review of Trial Exhibit 94, Townsend
acknowledged that according to RMA, companies between $1 and $3 million annual
revenue hold cash equivalents is $185,077. See, Trial Transcript, Vol. I at Page 121,
lines 1-13.
While the Trial Court was presented with contradictory evidence on the issue of
the cash on hand, it nevertheless made the decision that the cash on hand should remain
with PAJ. The Trial Court rejected Townsend's opinion that PAJ should only maintain a
year end cash reserve of $10,000. The Trial Court was within its discretion to make that
decision. That decision should not be overturned.
PAJ Maintained its Capital Reserves
Peterson seeks to portray PAJ's retention of cash on hand as of December 31,
2006 as a conspiracy by the remaining shareholders to keep the money for themselves.
For this argument to take root, the remaining shareholders would need to have disbursed
the money after December 31, 2006. This did not happen. Jackson confirmed that there
was no distribution in January of 2007. See, Trial Transcript, Vol. II at Page 236, lines
10-11. Trial Exhibit 93 demonstrates PAJ continued to build its capital reserves after
January 2007. Again, after weighing all the evidence the Trial Court determined that
Peterson was not entitled to any of the cash on had on December 31, 2006. Again, this
decision should not be overturned.
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Fair Value Must Take into Account Liabilities of PAJ
Peterson also argues that "as a matter of law the fair value determination can not
and should not take into account liabilities which do not become due until after the
valuation date." See Page 41 of Peterson's Appellee Brief. Peterson failed to cite any
relevant authority for this unique position. Peterson's position is equivalent to saying that
a corporation with $1 million in assets and $2 million of debt should still be able to sell
its shares for $1 million. Such a position can not withstand legal or logical scrutiny.
Peterson attempts to bolster this argument by stating PAJ should cover accounts
payable with its accounts receivable. If Peterson's logic is continued, than accounts
receivable should not be considered as part of the valuation of PAJ. However, Peterson's
expert Townsend included accounts receivable of $369,432 and liabilities of $61,765 in is
valuation of PAJ. See, Trial Exhibit 90, Schedule D (Townsend's Expert Report).
While the Trial Court ultimately rejected Townsend's determination of liabilities,
it is important to note that Peterson's own expert considered both accounts receivable and
liabilities in his determination of fair value of PAJ.
Valuing PAJ as a Going Concern
The Hogle Court, inter alia, held that in determining fair value one does not use
liquidation value but rather valuing the business as a "going concern." See Hogle v.
Zinetics Medical Inc., 63 P.3d 80 (Utah 2002).
A "going concern" requires cash reserves. The fact that Townsend allocated
$10,000 to cash reserves acknowledges the need for cash reserves. The Trial Court
ultimately rejected Townsend's position that $10,000 was a sufficient amount of cash
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reserves for a company with approximately $115,000 in monthly expenses. See, Trial
Transcript, Vol. II at Pages 237-238, lines 24-1. The Trial Court made the factual
determination that PAJ should retain all of its cash on hand as cash reserves.
If the Trial Court were tasked with determining the liquidation value of PAJ then
the cash on hand (after paying all liabilities) would be an appropriate measure. But
Townsend, Bowles and the Trial Court, as well as controlling precedent, each
acknowledge undervaluation that results from using a liquidation approach.
II
THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY EXERCISED ITS STATUTORY
DISCRETION IN ITS AWARD OF INTEREST
Peterson contends the Trial Court erred by failing to award interest at ten percent
(10%) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1(2). Rather than rely on Utah Code Ann. §151-1(2), the Court awarded interest to Peterson as follows:
"[I]t is equitable to award the Plaintiff prejudgment interest. The Court finds
guidance in the in the Post Judgment Interest Rates set by the State of Utah. These
rates are based on a variety of economic indicators and generally reflect a fair
interest rate, absent an agreement otherwise. The Post Judgment Interest Rates for
the years in which this amount is due are as follows: 2007 - 6.99%; 2008 5.42%; 2009 - 2.40%. The Court orders that these rates will apply for the
applicable time period in which Plaintiff was entitled to judgment.'" April 17,
2009 Decision, page 10.
This Court should uphold the Trial Court's decision on the interest rate for the
following reasons:
Incorrect Standard of Review
Peterson asserts that the standard of review on the issues is correctness and
contends that the issues of prejudgment interest are a question of law. This is an
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incorrect standard of review in this particular case. Peterson's argument, if properly
addressed, contains two questions: One, whether interest should be awarded; and if so
than Two, what is the rate of that interest? While the award of prejudgment interest may
be a question of law in many circumstances, it is not in this particular matter. Peterson
brought a statutory cause of action, namely a judicial decree of dissolution under Utah
Code Ann. §16-10a-1430. PAJ elected to purchase Peterson's shares in lieu of that
dissolution under Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1434, which contains particular language
regarding first, whether to award interest, and second, the rate of that interest; see Utah
Code Ann. §16-10a-1434(5)(c) which states: "interest may be allowed at the rate and
from the date determined by the court to be equitable..."
Thus, according to the explicit language of the statute, both the decision on
whether to award interest and the rate of that interest is left to the discretion of the Trial
Court, which must be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Peterson cites Kealamkia v Kealamakia, 2009 UT App 148, ^4, 213 P.3d 13
(quoting Trail Mt. Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 884 P.2d 1265,
1271-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)), which states: "The trial court's award of prejudgment
interest, and the amount thereof, presents a question of law which we review for
correctness." The Kealamkia Court also stated the following: "A trial court's
interpretation of unambiguous contract constitutes a question of law," Id. at 1269.
The instant case does not present such a question, but rather, the Trial Court's
discretionary determination of an "equitable" rate of interest.
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Peterson has Failed to Marshal Evidence
Given that Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1434(5)(c) specifically states: "Interest may
be allowed at a rate andfroma date determined by the court to be equitable," this
necessitates a marshaling of the evidence that would allow this Court to analyze this
equitable determination by the Trial Court.
"Evaluating conflicting testimony is the proper role of thefinderof fact. When an
appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the lower court's
findings of fact, '[an appellate court does] not weigh the evidence de novo.' In re
Estate ofBartell, 116 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 989). Rather, [the appellate court]
accords great deference to the lower court'sfindings,'especially when they are
based on an evaluation of conflicting live testimony.9 Id. at 886. Moreover, 'to
mount a successful challenge to the correctness of a trial court'sfindingsof fact,
[the]appellant mustfirstmarshal all the evidence supporting the finding and then
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support thefindingseven
viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below.' Aha Indus. Ltd. V
Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282,1284 (Utah 1993) (quoting Reid v. Mut. Of Omaha Ins. Co.,
776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989))."
Peterson has made no attempt to marshal any evidence in regard to the Trial Court's
decision regarding interest.
Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1 is not Applicable
In 2007, the Utah Supreme Court issued a decision in Wilcox v. Anchor Wate Co.,
164 P.3d 353 (Utah 2007). In Wilcox, the Appellant in part, argued that the Trial Court's
use of Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1 in an action involving "voidable preferences" under
Utah's Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act, was incorrect. The Supreme Court
overturned the Trial Court's reliance on Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1. The Supreme Court
reasoned that, "[T]he theoretical underpinning behind section 15-1-1 is that the parties to
a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of
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money, goods, or causes of action that are the subject of their contract. Only when the
parties to a contract fail to specify a rate of interest does the default rate specified in
section 15-1-1(2) apply. But this case is not a contract action." (Emphasis added).
In Wilcox, the Court was left with a gap in interpretation of an ambiguous
provision of the Utah's Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act because said Act
failed to state the manner in which a Court should calculate interest. The Trial Court was
required therefore to find "when filling in gaps or interpreting ambiguous provisions of
the Liquidation Act, we look to the preference provisions of federal bankruptcy law,
which have the same purpose as the preference provisions of the Liquidation Act.
Therefore, when calculating the prejudgment interest on remand the District Court should
use the rate applied to judgments obtained in federal preference actions which Is the
federal post-judgment interest rate". Id. at 364.
Fortunately, this Court is not left with a similar ambiguous statute. Utah Code
Ann. §16-10a-1434 specifically gives the Trial Court discretion to establish an equitable
rate. In exercising that discretion, the Trial Court relied upon Utah's post-judgment
interest rates. This is the same approach that the Court of Appeals suggested the Trial
Court, in Wilcox, undertake when it referred the Trial Court to rely upon federal postjudgment interest rates. Id. at 364.
Principles of Statutory Construction Compel the Court not to Rely on Utah Code
Ann, S15-1-1
Setting aside the Supreme Court's clear articulation that Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1
only applies to contract rate cases, standard principles of statutory construction reject the
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application of Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1. It would be inconsistent with the principles of
statutory interpretation to ignore the more specific statute to rely upon the general statute.
If the Court were to conclude that Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1 controlled, it would treat §1610a-1434(5)(c) as meaningless or illusory. This result is contrary to Thomas v. Color
Country Management, 84 P.3d 1201 (Utah 2004), wherein the Court stated: "Our
rejection of statutory interpretations that render statutory rights 'worthless and of no
material benefit' or 'meaningless or illusory' is consistent with the rule that we consider
factors such as convenience, reasonableness, and justice in determining the procedural or
substantive character of statutes." Similar rules of statutory interpretation are set forth in
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 514 P.2d 217 (Utah 1973) and State Division of
Forestry, Fire and State Lands v. Tooele County, 44 P.3d 680 (Utah 2002).
Because Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1434 specifically states that it is the Court that
may determine the interest rate and may determine the date by which the interest rate
should be calculated, it is clear that Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1 does not govern, but rather
the Trial Court. There was sufficient evidence to support the Trial Court's decision.
Failure to Preserve the Issue
PAJ does note that Peterson failed to raise the question of sufficiency of findings
of prejudgment interest with the Trial Court. Thus any claim that the Court's findings are
insufficient is waived. Nevertheless, PAJ does point to the record supporting the Court's
reliance on post-judgment interest rate. Bowles testified that the rate of return should be
commensurate with the risk of the investment. See, Trial Transcript, Vol. II at Pages
179-181, lines 12-25,1-25, and 1-19 respectively.
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The Trial Court had 100% of PAJ's assets with Peterson only at 36.37% percent
shareholder. As such, Peterson's investment had very little risk. Peterson now contends
'that no compelling equitable reasoning was given as to the reason why the Trial Court
arbitrarily awarded a lesser rate of interest." Peterson failed to preserve this issue by not
seeking additional findings of fact as required by Alta Indus. Ltd v. Hurst, 846 P.2d
1282, 1284 (Utah 1993).
Bowles also cited comparable treasury yields of 4.91% in his expert report. See,
Trial Exhibit 91, Exhibit 3 (Bowles Expert Report). Peterson's expert, Townsend, also
referenced a treasury yield of 4.91% when establishing his capitalization rate. See, Trial
Exhibit 90, Schedule F (Townsend Expert Report).
Finally, the Trial Court's reliance upon post-judgment interest rates is perfectly
consistent with the instructions that the Supreme Court gave in Wilcox.
Inapplicability of Utah Code Ann, 816-10a-1301
Peterson argues that the Court should look to the language in Utah Code Ann.
§16-10a-1301 involving Dissenter's Rights. Therein, the Utah State Legislature took the
effort to define interest rates set forth in Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1. That language became
effective in 1992, the very same year in which Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1434 became
effective. The fact that the Legislature did not use the same definition for interest should
be of importance to the Court. The Legislature demonstrated an ability and a willingness
to cite Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1 in the dissenter's right statute, but chose not to do so
when determining interest on an election to purchase in lieu of dissolution under Utah
Code Ann. §16-10a-1434. Rather, the Legislature chose to leave the award of interest
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and the interest rate to the discretion of the Court on terms that are "equitable". This
Court should honor the choice of the Legislature to craft different interest remedies under
different statutory provisions and refuse to overturn the Trial Court's interest rates to be
applied to the fair value of Peterson's shares.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT AWARDING EITHER
PARTY COSTS OR ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The Trial was conducted as a bench trial and took place over three days.
Testimony of the parties' expert witnesses were concluded at the end of day one.
Significant time during the remaining two days was spent on evidence pertaining to the
allegations of oppressive conduct and related allegations. PAJ admitted in their answer
that the Company should be dissolved due to shareholder deadlock. Thus, the only
reason Peterson raised these issues was an effort to recover attorney fees.
After hearing such testimony, the Trial Court referred back to a comment made
during opening arguments that this case was "basically a marriage license away and this
being a divorce case." See, Trial Transcript, Vol. I, at Page 7, lines 1-2. Emotions run
high and feelings are hurt when shareholders experience operational deadlock. While the
Trial Court recognized these feelings, it also recognized that this case did not warrant the
awarding of attorneys9 fees. This decision should not be disturbed
Standard Review
The awarding of attorneys9 fees in this particular proceeding lies with the
discretion of the Trial Court. "In general, Utah follows the traditional American rule that

23

attorney fees cannot be recovered by a prevailing party unless a statute or contract
authorizes such an award." Utahnsfor Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Davis County
Clerk, 175 P.3d 1036, 1039 ^5 (Utah 2007) (citing Hughes v. Cqfferty, 2004 UT 22, ^21,
89 P.3d 148. This is not a contract case. Thus, the only means of recovering fees is
under statute.
Unique Statutory Language Regarding the Awarding of Attorney's Fees
Statutory language addressing attorney fees in this proceeding is articulated in
Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1434(5)(d), which reads, "[i]f the court finds that the
petitioning shareholder had probable grounds for relief under Subsection 16- 10a1430(2)(b) or (d), it may award to the petitioning shareholder reasonable fees and
expenses of counsel and experts employed by the petitioning shareholder". (Emphasis
added).
The statute employs a two-step process prior to awarding fees. Both steps involve
questions of fact and exercise of the Trial Court's discretion. In order to award fees, the
Trial Court first must find probable grounds that the directors acted in illegal, oppressive
orfraudulentmanner, or that the corporate assets are misapplied or wasted. Even if the
Trial Court makes that factual determination, it still has the discretion whether or not to
award attorneys' fees.
This statute differs from several other attorneys' fees statutes that require a court
to award attorneys' fees.
Failure to Marshal Evidence
The following references to the record demonstrate that Peterson failed to marshal
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evidence which precludes the overturning of the Trial Court's decision on this issue.
Evidence upon which the Trial Court relied in Deciding not to Award Attorney Fees
Management Styles
Peterson failed to cite to evidence describing the different management styles of
the shareholders that led to deadlock. Jackson preferred value billing to Peterson's
hourly billing, with Jackson being more of a macro-manager in reaching overall client
satisfaction versus Peterson being a micro-manager. See, Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill at
Pages 399-400, lines 19-25,1-16, respectively. Peterson's approach to handling finances
for PAJ was a "hand-to-mouth" approach, which created significant anxiety, as compared
to Allred's approach in retaining sufficient cash to cover unexpected expenses. See Trial
Transcript, Vol. II at Pages 238-239, lines 2-25 and 1-5, respectively.
The Termination of Trevor Seamons
Jackson testified that Trevor Seamons was unsuccessful in helping to "develop
and move forward the investment practices of the firm." See, Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill at
Page 397, lines 10-11. Also, Jackson noted that before terminating Trevor, PAJ "tried to
find different roles that Trevor could participate in the firm." See, Trial Transcript, Vol.
Ill at Pages 397-398, lines 25, and 1-2, respectively. Further, Jackson noted that PAJ
"tried to use him some in tax but Trevor wasn't trained in tax." See, Trial Transcript,
Vol. Ill at Page 398, lines 5-7. Jackson summarized that when making the decision to let
Trevor Seamons go, Jackson and Allred evaluated his productivity and found that Trevor
Seamons' billings were $77,000 which amount was written down by Peterson to
$2,000—a write off of over 97%. See, Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill at Page 399, lines 8-13.
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Difficulty Allred faced choosing between Jackson and Peterson
Allred testified regarding the great difficulty he was placed in, in having to choose
between Jackson's and Peterson's visions of the firm. Because of the discord in
management between Jackson and Peterson, all agreed that "either one or the other would
go..." See, Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill at Page 418, lines 24-25.
Jackson recounts this experience in his testimony as follows: "We were at a
deadlock. We had led up to a point where Jack characterizes it very accurately when he
says that I said either he's going or I'm going. We had led up to a point where I sat in, it
was Alan's office, Jack was in there and I was in there and I was so frustrated with the
lack of movement to resolve our differences that I simply reached a point where I was
either leaving or Jack was leaving. It didn't matter to me which way it went at that point
of time, it was one or the other." See, Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill at Pages 403-404, lines
19-25 and lines 1-2, respectively.
Jackson also recounts Allred's efforts to keep the parties together and has testified:
"To Alan's credit and unfortunately and this part I do feel really bad about, is Jack
doesn't know the length and the extent of efforts that Alan went to keep this tiling
together. Alan did everything he could do to get me and Jack to reconcile and work
through our differences. It didn't work." See, Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill at Page 404, lines
9-14.
Allred described it as, ".. .one of the most difficult periods of my life, where I had
to look at, educate myself and on and review every circumstance with regards to the
avenues of resolution and finally it reached that point where we knew there would be
26

none..." See, Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill at Page 419, lines 9-13.
Jackson also acknowledged the difficulty in Alfred's decision when he stated: "I
believe Alan when he said he made the decision that was the best for the firm. But I
think if Alan at that point in time had to make a personal decision, it would have been a
different decision but he made a decision that was best for the employees of the firm and
for the firm itself." See, Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill at Page 404, lines 15-20.
Change to the Bylaws
Peterson makes much ado about the efforts to amend the Bylaws that took place in
the Fall of 2006. Peterson fails to point out that proposed amendments to the Bylaws
{see, Trial Exhibit 13) simply adopted sections of Utah's Revised Business Incorporation
Act regarding directors meetings, shareholder meetings, and quorums. Peterson also
points out that his Motion for Preliminary Injunction preventing the approval of the
Bylaws was denied by Judge Low.
Alfred testified that PAJ only adopted the Bylaws after Judge Low authorized
such. See, Trial Transcript, Vol. II at Pages 319-320, lines 23-25 and lines 1-16,
respectively.
Claim of Withheld Salary
Peterson also raised an issue regarding the withholding of salary, but fails to
describe Alfred's decision to make distributions to the shareholders rather than payroll
was ".. .to avoid the additional expenses of payroll taxes." See, Trial Transcript, Vol. II
at Page 303, lines 11-12.
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Growth to PAJ
Peterson aims to impugn the acts and attentions of Jackson and Allred. However
during this same time, PAJ generated substantially more gross revenue by the end of
2006 then it had in September 2001; PAJ had basically doubled in size. See, Trial
Transcript, Vol. I at Page 18, lines 2-5. This is hardly a wasting of assets or oppressive
conduct.
Productivity of the Partners
Trial Exhibit 91, Table 3 (Bowles Expert Report), attached hereto and
incorporated herein, illustrates the productivity of the three partners from 2002 to 2006
and demonstrates that during that period of time, Peterson's billings under Management
dropped from 25% to 12%. Allred9s billings in Management remained fairly consistent
at 39% to 34%, and Jackson's billings in Management increased from 36% to 54%,
demonstrating that Jackson was a 'rainmaker' in the firm and benefited Peterson greatly
during thatfive-yearperiod.
Change of Passwords
In regards to the allegations regarding changes of passwords, the Trial Court heard
testimony that the passwords were changed only after Peterson had initiated litigation for
dissolution and PAJ had exercised its rights to purchase in lieu of dissolution, which
under Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1434, would have placed the last day of Peterson's
ownership of shares as November 6,2006. In short, it was done after PAJ had elected to
buy Peterson's shares and after the filing of the Verified Complaint. And, since it
occurred after the Verified Complaint was filed, it could not have been an allegation pled
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in the Verified Complaint. See Trial Transcript, Vol III at Page 421 lines 3-25 page 422
1-7.
Change of Locks
In regards to changing the locks on the office and building doors, again the Trial
Court heard testimony from Alfred that: 1. He was not even sure that there were even
locks on individual office doors, see, Trial Transcript, Vol. II at Page 307, lines 3-8; 2.
The locks to the exterior of the building were only changed in January 2007, after
Peterson's employment was terminated and almost two months after the initiation of the
litigation, see, Trial Transcript, Vol. II at Page 307, lines 9-14; and, 3. Peterson was
given ample opportunity to go through his office and to get his personal belongings prior
to the locks being changed, see, Trial Transcript, Vol. II at Page 307, lines 15-19.
Communication with Employees and Clients
Alfred testified that neither he nor Jackson gave any instructions to employees
about the anticipated termination of Peterson, that they never held a meeting with
employees before Peterson left, and that they never had communication with clients that
Peterson would be leaving before he was terminated. See, Trial Transcript, Vol. II at
Pages 307-308, line 25 and lines 1-12, respectively.
The absence of reference to these points in the record demonstrates Peterson's
failure to marshal evidence on this issue, precluding recovery. The Trial Court had
sufficient information to find that Peterson did not have probable grounds for relief under
Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1432(b) or (d) and the Trial Court further had the ability to, and
properly exercised its discretion, in not awarding either party reasonable attorneys' fees.
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Peterson was Largest Shareholder
The parties stipulated to the respective percentage ownership in the company,
namely: Peterson owned 36.37%, Allred owned 33.34%, and Jackson owned 30.63%.
This ownership is as of June 1,2006, as stated in Peterson's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Injuctive [sic] Relief dated January 19, 2007. See, Trial Exhibit 152.1 %7. As
such, Peterson was the largest holder of stock in PAJ. As the largest shareholder,
Peterson had an equal fiduciary duty to the other shareholders. The circumstances
surrounding this case are akin to a corporate marriage. Because of irreconcilable
differences/deadlock, the matter was ripe for dissolution/divorce. Simply because
shareholders disagree on how a company should move forward does not mean that they
engaged in oppressive or fraudulent behavior. The fact that PAJ almost doubled in
revenues over the previous five (5) years demonstrates the wisdom in the chosen
approach to manage the company, despite the fact that that approach was contrary to the
wishes of Peterson.
Such was not the case in Bingham Consolidation Company v. Groesbeck, 105 P.3d
365 (Utah Ct. App. 2004), where there was a single shareholder that held a majority of
the stock who was "negotiating both sides of the transaction".
Expectation of a Job
On appeal, Peterson (for the first time) argues that the ownership in PAJ
established his expectation of a job in PAJ, and that his termination constituted
oppressive conduct. First and foremost, the issue was not argued at trial. Second, the
only evidence Peterson now proffers is that he had worked there historically. Third,
30

Peterson was not terminated until January 6,2007- over 2 months after the Verified
Complaint was filed. See Trial Transcript Vol. II at Page 306, lines 3-11; See also Trial
Exhibit 17. The Notice of the Directors meeting reflects that this meeting was initially
scheduled for December 29,2006. Petersons9 termination cannot, therefore, be grounds
for filing the Verified Complaint.
Fourth, if Peterson had expected employment as a part of his ownership, then
employment terms would have been included in PAJ's Bylaws — not a separate
employment contract that explicitly provides that his employment was "at will." See,
Trial Exhibit 54, constituting the Peterson Employment Contract, paragraph 1.4).
The fact that Allred and Jackson waited until two months after the filing of the
Complaint and after settlement negotiations broke down to terminate Peterson
demonstrates (in the words of the pentagon) "courageous restraint."
Incorrect Citation of Law
On Page 53 of Peterson's Brief, he states a five-point test for determining whether
minority shareholders are entitled to use judicial dissolution based upon oppressive or
unfairly prejudiced behavior. In doing so, Peterson cites Kiriakides v. Atlas Foods
Systems, 541 S.E.2d 257 (S.C. 2001). These issues were not adopted by the Trial Court.
These five elements were initially proffered by the Court of Appeals. However, in
Kiriakides the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that these definitions "are
beyond the scope of [South Carolina's] judicial dissolution statute." Id. at 264.
In short not only are these five elements are not found in Utah law, they were rejected by
South Carolina.
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In summary, after three days of trial, the Trial Court found it was not equitable to
award attorney's fees to Peterson. Accordingly, this ruling should not be disturbed.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, PAJ respectfully requests that this Court reject
Peterson's claims on cross-appeal for failure to marshal the evidence, or alternatively
with a finding that the Trial Court appropriately exercised its discretion by holding that
Peterson was not entitled to any additional cash distribution; that the "equitable" interest
rate was appropriate; and, not awarding either party attorney's fees and costs.
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